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Abstract 
Prior studies of China's corporate governance often conclude that a weak 
independence of board of directors is one of the key problems in corporate 
China. The previous empirical studies on board structure mainly concen-
trate on the relationship between the proportion of independent directors 
in the board and firm performance, which yield no consistent results and 
fail to explain the poor performance of independent directors. This thesis 
investigates the monitoring effectiveness of independent directors by their 
negative opinion issuances using the data of listed companies in Shanghai 
Stock Exchanges from 2002 to 2006. The monitoring effectiveness of in-
dependent directors should be affected by not only the board structure but 
also their personal characteristics in order to monitor the firm vigilantly and 
make strategic decisions. 
In companies with similar performance and firm size, we try to test if 
there is a relationship between the likelihood of issuing negative opinion 
by their independent directors and their personal characteristics, such as 
political and educational background. We find that the independent direc-
tors that possess more political power, such as former government officials, 
communist party members, and those who secure a position in the senior 
management will be more likely to issue a negative opinion. The level of inde-
pendence of the board, captured by the board composition factors, together 
with better regional governance also has a positive effect on the likelihood of 
negative opinion issuance. These findings are robust to using data of Special 
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1 Introduction 
Among different research fields in economics, corporate governance has re-
cently been a hot topic. The study of corporate governance nowadays is 
very comprehensive. In order to have a clear understanding of the whole 
picture, together with a reasonable model to match the continually changing 
practice of corporate governance, researchers try to fully analyze the mech-
anism of corporate governance by using various perspectives and adding 
new elements, such as finance, accountancy and law into the framework. 
The complexity of the problem could be illustrated by the vigorous debates 
found in the recent literature, including controversies of both theoretical 
model building and empirical results. 
In older literature, corporate governance generally refers to the conflicts 
between insiders and outsiders resulting from the separation of ownership 
and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). There is so-called an agency 
problem, or conflict of interest, arising between owners and managers of 
a company (Hart, 1995). Managers may be selfish and they may not be 
concerned with the interests of the owners in running the corporations. Ef-
fective corporate governance can reduce the agency cost such that agents 
will act in line with the interests of principals. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
further define corporate governance by stating that it “deals with the way 
in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investments". John and Senbet (1998) suggest a more com-
prehensive definition that "corporate governance deals with mechanisms by 
which stakeholders of a corporation exercise control over corporate insiders 
and management such that their interests are protected." The problem is 
not only between the managers and shareholders, but also the members of 
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the organization, like workers and consumers. Denis and McConnell (2003) 
agree with the idea and suggest that corporate governance is the sum of 
internal and external mechanisms.i 
Board of directors has long been a main concern in the field of internal 
mechanisms in corporate governance. They are believed to be an effective 
means of monitoring management performance as managerial collusion may 
be reduced by the presence of independent outside directors in the board, 
who are all supposed to be professional and independent enough to judge 
whether the managers are acting in the companies' interests (Winter, 1977, 
Fama, 1980 and Weisbach, 1988). However, Mace (1986) questions the mon-
itoring effectiveness of outside directors as managers may choose the outside 
directors and provide the information they analyze by dominating the board. 
There are many empirical studies concerning the board structure and the 
appointment of independent directors. Bhagat and Black (1997) find no 
evidence that the proportion of outside directors affects firm performance. 
Yermack (1997) even argues that, the corporate performances of firms with 
a high percentage of independent directors are lower. On the other hand, 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) find an abnormal increase in firm value after 
the appointment of additional outside directors. Herraalin and Weisbach 
(1988) also discover that after a period of weak performance of firms, they 
tend to increase the number of appointments of outside directors. Stock 
(1999) finds statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns during the 
two-window announcement of the appointment of independent outside direc-
tors. Ghosh and Sirmans (2003) try to use a sample of REITs to scrutinize 
the effect, and they conclude that independent directors in some way en-
iThe external mechanisms stand for the disciplining mechanisms outside the firm, such 
as competition in product and factor market, security analyst, the legal environment, 
etc. This is different from the internal mechanisms, like institutional investors, board of 
directors that are considered as a component within the corporation. 
2 
hance REITs' performance, but the effect is weak. 
Although there are a vast number of studies of the board structure, the 
results are not consistent, and few of them address China. The independent 
directorship and the supervisory board system of China have both been 
"borrowed" from the west in improving corporate governance since 1992 as 
the Chinese securities regulator, the China Securities Regulatory Commis-
sion (CSRC), was established that year. Yet, recent surveys show that the 
corporate governance in China is still lagging behind other Asian countries 
(Premond and Capaul, 2002). Given a different economic, legal and social 
environment, people often remain skeptical about whether the "borrowed" 
mechanism can effectively monitor the managerial activities in China. 
Lin (2004) points out that one of the key problems of corporate gover-
nance in China is a weak independent board of directors. The argument 
seems to be anecdotal; nevertheless, the empirical studies on this topic are 
extremely limited. No one has ever asked why or whether the independent 
directors in China are really so ineffective. They basically follow the previ-
ous studies to focus only on the proportion of independent directors in the 
board, which yield no consistent results. For example, Chen (2002) conducts 
a simple empirical study and notices that there is no relationship between 
the size of board of directors and corporate performance. Instead, he finds 
a negative relationship between independent directors, represented by the 
percentage of independent directors in the board of directors, and corporate 
performance. Shan and Zhang (2004) also shows that corporate performance 
in China is mostly influenced by return on asset (ROA) and other economic 
variables but they do not discover any significant impact of independent 
directorship on corporate performance. On the other hand, Gao, Ren and 
Ying (2005) finds that a higher share of outside directors suppresses asset 
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appropriation. 
It is therefore difficult to answer whether independent directors can ef-
fectively monitor the firm. The failure of capturing an empirical relation-
ship between the board structure and performance shows tha t the issue is 
not a simple one. The variables used previously, like the ratio of indepen-
dent directors, act as a proxy to capture the level of independence of the 
board, in hoping that the board independence will be enough to bring a 
positive impact on the board effectiveness and ultimately on corporate per-
formance. But more and more studies start to doubt this previous model 
setting. Firstly, the usage of firm performance so as to capture agency cost 
or effective monitoring is not complete (Klein, 1998). The measurement 
of firm performance is difficult to define and it varies among studies. Sec-
ondly, by using the ratio of independent directors as a proxy to represent 
the structure of the board, researchers assume that all independent directors 
are homogenous. This is not realistic and cannot show the whole picture of 
the board, such as board diversity, board culture and competence. Thus, 
recently studies start to revise their analysis by adopting a more individual-
based perspective, instead of the general board perspective, at tempting to 
discover new explanations prior to ambiguous empirical results. Including 
personal characteristics of directors in the study of board structure is an 
example. 
Only a few studies have tried to use personal characteristics of directors 
to explain the board effectiveness or firm performance empirically (Kosnik, 
1987, Grace et al.，1995’ Klein, 1998，Agrawal and Knober, 2000, O'Regan 
and Oster, 2005). The scarce literature found in this field of research should 
be due to either a lack of either theoretical foundations (O'Regan and Oster, 
2005) or a good measure of board effectiveness (Bhagat and Black, 1997). 
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Berghe and Baelden (2005) points out that the independent at t i tude taken 
by the directors in the board is also very important in considering the board 
effectiveness. But the independent attitude, such as the willingness of direc-
tors, is difficult to measure. As a paper of economic study, this is already out 
of our scope. In this thesis, we try to reexamine the relationship between 
personal characteristics, board structure and the monitoring effectiveness 
of independent directors by observable discrete board decisions, similar to 
Carcello and Neal (2000). With a new dataset of negative opinion issuance 
by independent directors in China, the thesis shreds light on the actual ac-
tions taken by independent directors, as studies in U.S. lack this kind of 
observations. The board room will no longer be a black box that outsiders 
can hardly understand what independent directors are doing inside that . 
We are able to test the relationship between the monitoring effectiveness of 
independent directors and the personal characteristics, as well as the board 
structure and regional governance, in controlling firm size and performance 
of the specific firms. Consider two companies which are both poorly per-
forming. The one in which independent directors issued negative opinions 
should be more effective in monitoring, while the independent directors in 
the other company did not, as those who are "brave" enough to speak out 
the errors prevailing in the companies and to urge for more improvements 
should at least show they are more vigilant in monitoring and more indepen-
dent in decision-making. The monitoring effectiveness of the independent 
directors should be influenced by their personal characteristics, such as ed-
ucational and political background, based on theories built on agency costs 
and external monitoring (Klein, 1998，Agrawal and Knoeber, 2000). 
The thesis will be presented as follows. Section 2 contains a literature 
review about the personal characteristics and board structure. We will form 
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our main hypotheses in Section 3. The methodology and data will be in-
troduced in Section 4 and Section 5. Section 6 shows the empirical findings 
together with the related results of statistical tests. Section 7 summarizes 
and concludes the findings. 
2 Literature Review 
The previous economic literature of corporate governance in China usu-
ally concentrates on the effects of ownership structure on firm performance 
since one of the salient features of Chinese listed companies is the highly-
concentrated state ownership. The monitoring effectiveness of the board 
of independent directors is somehow neglected or it is only considered as 
the minor effect compared with the researchers' major interest. To our 
knowledge, there are currently no related empirical studies concerning the 
personal characteristics of independent directors and the respective moni-
toring effectiveness in C h i n a . 2 Nevertheless, in questioning reasons behind 
the failure of the independent directorship system in China, Clark (2006) ar-
gues that personal characteristics of the independent directors from China, 
such as education and business experience, should be more important in 
judging the monitoring effectiveness, compared to the case of U.S., since 
the independent directors in U.S. firms more or less share common personal 
^Wang (2005) tries to illustrate the situation by the descriptive statistics of independent 
directors of Chinese listed firms. By collecting data from 1204 listed companies from two 
major stock markets, he argues that since a large proportion of independent directors are 
taking several jobs at the same time (for example, 56.24% of professors are having more 
than one occupation, except the role of being an independent director), the independent 
directors may not have enough time to monitor a specific company. He also points out that 
as there are only 3 independent directors on average in the listed companies, the monitoring 
power of the independent directors is very limited. Furthermore, the paper criticizes that 
one of the weaknesses is due to the appointment method, which is not formalized. Some of 
the independent directors are appointed because of their good relations with the company's 
CEO. Some of them are even appointed despite their under-qualifications. As a result, the 
independent directors could not monitor the firm effectively. Unfortunately, the analysis 
should be described as a qualitative one instead of a quantitative one. Many arguments 
are not empirically justified. 
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characteristics, while there are more variations in the personal background 
seen from Chinese firms' independent directors. 
In fact, whether personal characteristics of directors matter in monitor-
ing effectiveness has also been a research target by using da ta of western 
firms, however, there is only a few of literature available. This is probably 
due to the limited availability of readily accessible data. We will still ad-
dress some of them here. Kosnik (1987) compiled a pioneer work in using a 
discrete board task to evaluate the board effectiveness and its relationship 
with board composition and structure. By using greenmail acceptance as 
a proxy of board's ineffectiveness, the paper compares the board structure 
of 53 companies that paid greenmail and 57 that did not pay during 1979 
to 1983. The major finding is that the company with more outside direc-
tors sitting on board and more directors with executive experience will be 
more effective in rejecting greenmail. This early study already suggests that 
individual characteristics will be significant in judging board effectiveness. 
Grace, et al. (1995) is one of the very few researchers that investigate 
the relationship between non-executive directors' characteristics and board 
composition with corporate financial performance. From a sample of eighty-
six Australian listed public companies randomly selected from the Top 500 
companies in 1992，they are interested in whether the financial performance 
of a specific company with a higher proportion of non-executive directors 
having a tertiary degree will be better than others that have a lower pro-
portion. Other than education, past experience such as prior board service, 
is also considered. The only significant result is the qualification and the 
relationship with corporate performance is negative. They argue that the 
individual characteristics are not very important, and the negative relation-
ship is due to window dressing by the non-executive directors. 
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O'Regan and Oster (2005) also try to look into the relationship between 
individual board member characteristics and board performance. By us-
ing a relatively new dataset from New York City nonprofits, they try to see 
whether demographic profile of board members, such as occupation, age and 
gender, and other individual characteristics, like tenure received and serving 
multiple boards, have a relationship with monitoring behavior such as atten-
dance of board meetings and frequency of receiving evaluation reports. Most 
of the variables are not significant except some kind of occupation, showing 
that personal characteristics may not matter in monitoring effectiveness. 
3 Research Hypothesis 
3.1 Inst i tut ional Set t ing 
After the restarting of its stock market in the early 90s' the central govern-
ment of China has done a lot in trying to reform and improve the corporate 
governance of the listed companies so that the financial market will be more 
mature. On January 7, 2002 the CSRC released the Corporate Governance 
Principles for Chinese listed companies. The Principles require the listed 
companies to "establish an independent director system in accordance with 
relevant rules." The independent directors defined by the Principles should 
be those who do not have any position in the company except directors. 
The independent directors should be independent enough so that they can 
function without the influence of the company's major shareholders or other 
parties who have a relationship of interest in the company. 
On August 16，2001，the CSRC also released the "Guidance Opinion on 
the Establishment of an Independent Director System in Listed Companies" 
to further govern the mechanism of the independent directorship. For ex-
ample, the Opinion requires that at least one of the independent directors is 
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an accounting professional. There are at least two independent directors by 
June 30, 2002 and there should be one third of them sitting in the board by 
June 30, 2003. There are also qualifications requirements, for example, basic 
knowledge relevant to the operations of the listed company, work experience 
and professional qualifications, etc. 
Still, the monitoring mechanism of independent board of directors may 
not be as effective as the government had imagined when they were intro-
duced into firms. This is because the business environment of China is a 
totally different picture to be considered. The independent directors may 
not be really that "independent" compared to those in the West because 
they may be appointed not because of their professions but their relations 
with the old-time directors or government officials. Some of them may only 
be transferred from inside directors into outside directors. The collusion 
between independent directors and top management to exploit firm assets 
regardless of the interests of shareholders are frequently reported in the me-
dia (Hu, 2003). Furthermore, corruption is another problem affecting the 
performance of independent directors. Those who are currently controlling 
the entire company and corroding the companies' assets will not want a 
"good" independent director to join their boards. As a result, they may try 
to bribe the independent directors to collude with them. 
Independent directors are people, not computer programs. There are no 
strict rules for them to follow. The social norm in Chinese society is that 
it is always better to keep silent even when there is a problem, because it 
will only cause that independent director more troubles when things become 
complicated. There are regular cases in China about independent directors 
being laid off after their open criticisms against their respective companies. 
Especially if there is a group of people, they will usually have such kind of 
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logic, “if the others are not speaking it out, why me?" Thus, the personal 
characteristics of independent directors themselves should be stressed even 
more in the case of China, apart from the board environment of the company, 
as it also determines whether the independent directors will take the role 
seriously. 
Like what have been shown in the previous literature, there is a lack 
of empirical evidence in showing the usefulness of independent directors in 
western countries and also in China. Clarke (2006) suggested one of the 
reasons that bring to the failure is the characteristics of independent direc-
tors. The differences in educational, occupational and political background 
among independent directors discovered by previous studies may indicate 
that though CSRC set some criteria for choosing independent directors the 
company may just satisfy the minimum requirements, so that not all in-
dependent directors are at the same level of standard and can effectively 
monitor the company. As a result, despite looking at the concentration of 
independent directors sitting in the board of directors, we should also look 
at each independent director chosen - whether they can really take the role 
seriously, or they just treat it merely as a title and are indolent about the 
affairs happening in the company. 
Finally, Carcello and Neal (2000) present evidence on the relationship 
between an audit committee composition and audit going-concern report-
ing behavior. By facilitating 223 companies experiencing financial distress, 
a Logistic model estimates that the greater the percentage of affiliated di-
rectors sitting on the audit committee, the greater the likelihood that the 
auditor will not issue a going-concern audit report. Based on the findings, 
they suggest that the audit committee should be composed of all indepen-
dent outside directors. Based on their results, we can construct a similar 
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model to test the relationship between the monitoring effectiveness of in-
dependent directors by their chances of issuing negative opinions and the 
personal characteristics, board composition, controlling firm size and per-
formance. 
3.2 T h e Monitoring Effectiveness of Independent Directors 
One of the most convincing features that could show an effective indepen-
dent directorship is to observe the independent directors' actual behaviors 
or so-called discrete board tasks, when firms are suffering from "gross failure 
of strategy and performance" In the case of China, according to the Guid-
ance Opinion, independent directors should express independent opinions 
towards significant events in the listed firm. The disclosure of independent 
opinions by the government monitoring body provides us a new perspec-
tive in measuring the individual monitoring effectiveness of independent 
directors when they issue negative opinions. In this paper we argue that 
independent directors with higher monitoring effectiveness will issue inde-
pendent opinions which are in line with all shareholders' interests. That 
means when the company is not doing well, for example, suffering from a 
loss, "good" independent directors will stand out and announce the prob-
lems they have discovered so that there will be an urge for reforms and 
improvements. However, comparison cannot be made when one company 
suffers from great problems while another has no problem at all. Even inde-
pendent directors from both companies that are taking the proper decision 
the former company will have more negative opinions issued than the latter, 
given the former has more operational problems observed. To compare the 
3The other discrete board tasks that have been discussed by previous literature include 
replacing the CEO (Weisbach, 1988), or making or defending against a takeover bid (Kon-
sik, 1987)，tender offer bills (Byrd and Hickman, 1992), adoption of Poison Pills (Brickley, 
Coles and Terry, 1994). 
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monitoring effectiveness of independent directors of two different companies, 
first of all we have to make Assumption 1: 
Assumpt ion 1 When the performance of two corporations is similar, and if 
the independent directors of one company issue a negative opinion regarding 
a specific problem, there must be similar problems in another company. 
Secondly, we have to rule out the possibility that independent directors will 
issue negative opinions even the company does not suffer from any problem. 
Thus we assume that all independent directors are rational: 
A s s u m p t i o n 2.1 Independent directors will not issue any negative opinion 
when the firms are operating without problems. 
Followed by Assumption 2.1 we can ensure that the negative opinion is-
suances are solely due to the problems occurring within the company that 
hurt corporate performance or shareholders' interests. The argument can 
be restated this way: 
A s s u m p t i o n 2.2 Independent directors will only issue negative opinions 
when the firms have problems that affect corporate performance and the 
rights of all shareholders. 
Based on Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, independent directors only have two 
choices left: i) issue or ii) not issue a negative opinion when there is a prob-
lem. We will define independent directors taking choice (i) are monitoring 
the firm more effectively than those taking choice (ii). Based on the above 
assumptions, like issuing going-concern reports by auditing committee, is-
suing a negative opinion by independent directors is also a difficult task 
and they will receive pressure from the management (Carcello and Neal, 
12 
2000). The independent directors in the board of a firm that issued nega-
tive opinions should be more vigilant in monitoring and more independent 
in decision-making in mitigating management pressure, than those who did 
not, given that performances of both firms are similar. 
In this thesis, we try to question whether the characteristics of inde-
pendent directors can significantly affect the monitoring effectiveness by 
providing empirical evidence. We believe that the monitoring effectiveness 
of independent directors in two firms with similar performances can be af-
fected by personal characteristics of independent directors and the board 
composition, after controlling for size and industry of the firms. To begin 
with, personal characteristics such as educational and political background 
should have decisive effects on monitoring effectiveness of the independent 
directors. For example, those with higher qualifications should be more able 
to exercise effective external monitoring (Fama and Jensen, 1983)，as the 
definition of board monitoring in agency theory presumes that independent 
directors should be able to identify the stockholders' interests as they have 
enough skills to evaluate the management performance effectively. Thus we 
will have our first hypothesis. 
H y p o t h e s i s 1 The likelihood of issuing negative opinions by the indepen-
dent directors is affected by their personal characteristics to monitor the 
firm. 
A detailed description of capturing the personal characteristics together with 
theoretical backgrounds and predictions of the effects associated with them 
will be introduced in the methodology section. 
Besides personal characteristics of the independent directors, we also 
believe that a company's board structure will play a role in determining 
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the likelihood of issuing negative opinions by the independent directors. A 
more independent board structure means the company is well-governed and 
under this environment the independent directors will be more willing to 
issue negative opinions when there is a problem. 
Moreover, they may have more independence or freedom to issue opin-
ions. This coincides with the previous literature as board independence is 
a measure of board effectiveness. On the other hand, if the board is not 
independent, independent directors will be more reluctant to say anything 
bad that may be thought as “unbeneficial” by some parties because this 
may eliminate their self-advantages in exploiting the company. They will 
be afraid of being removed by telling the truth to the other shareholders. 
So, we believe that a higher level of board independence in firms of similar 
performance will increase the chances of issuing negative opinions by the 
independent directors of firms and it forms our hypothesis. 
H y p o t h e s i s 2 The likelihood of issuing negative opinions by the indepen-
dent directors varies positively with the level of independence of the board in 
firms. 
The variables representing the board structure and the related level of board 
independence will be introduced in the methodology section. 
There is a growing disparity of economic development between different 
regions in China. The regions which have a higher economic growth, such as 
Shanghai and Guangdong, will be more developed and will be able to enjoy 
more economic freedom and openness. The government intervention in these 
areas is comparatively smaller than the less-developed areas, such as the 
inner and western part of China. Thus, there is so-called a different level of 
regional governance among different provinces that affect both economic and 
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investment environment. Better regional governance may give more freedom 
and independence to the independent directors to take effective monitoring 
because the environment will be more open, fair and transparent. Therefore, 
we will form our third hypothesis. 
H y p o t h e s i s 3 The likelihood of issuing negative opinions by the indepen-
dent directors varies •positively with different locations' regional governance 
level 
4 Methodology 
4.1 Negat ive Opinion Issuances 
We will try to capture the monitoring effectiveness by collecting all negative 
opinions issued by independent directors before. However, the "magnitude" 
of opinions issued by the independent directors is difficult to define. It will 
be subjective to judge whether the independent directors' opinions are really 
that positive or negative. We will therefore define an opinion for a specific 
event as negative if one or more of the following criteria are satisfied: 
• The content mentions violations of law and rules in the company op-
erations. 
• The content mentions "problems" and "difficulties" in a specific event. 
• The content mentions "negative" effects of company operations brought 
by a specific event. 
• The content marks this opinion as "reservation", "disapproval", "ob-
jection", and "uncertain". 
• The content mentions actions that have to be taken by the company 
in order to bring "improvements". 
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• The content mentions the extra attention needed to be paid by in-
vestors in a specific event. 
0 if an independent director has issued a negative 
OPINION — < opinion 1 if an independent director has not issued a negative 
� opinion. 
The negative opinions of independent directors can be categorized accord-
ing to some specific operational issues: 1) Board of directors' internal affairs 
relate to changes of people within the board of directors, or misconduct com-
mitted by some members with the board of directors. 2) External guarantee 
performance {duiwai danbao) is a special operational decision made by the 
Chinese companies to protect other business parties, usually related firms, 
from default or bankruptcy as the company that exercises this decision will 
help to pay back the loans made by the other business parties. External 
guarantee is not illegal under formal procedures, but often be treated as 
an action that will deeply affect the financial performance of the company. 
Moreover, there are always cases of making illegal external guarantee by 
board of directors to protect their self interests. 3) Related party transac-
tions {guanlian jiaoyi) are transactions between two parties having a special 
relationship, for example between a major shareholder and the corporation. 
It is mostly normal but sometimes may create conflicts of interest. 4) Asset 
appropriation, also known as tunneling, is the legal or illegal actions taken 
by large shareholders to transfer assets and profits to themselves. 5) Vio-
lation of regulation explains itself, and that is any action against the law. 
6) Asset transfer and 7) Capital funding are general operational decisions 
made by the management, but negative opinions will be issued against them 
because of various reasons. Finally, 8) Auditing matters usually relate to 
the auditing reports of the listed companies, for example, accounting fraud 
or dispersion discovered is common that trigger a negative opinion issuance. 
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4.2 T h e Personal Characteristics of Independent Directors 
We are trying to see whether the background of independent directors will 
affect their tendency to issue negative opinions of firms. In the same firm, 
some independent directors issue negative opinions regarding a specific prob-
lem but the others do not. The variations among them must be based on 
some unknown factors. One of the suggestions will be the difference of ex-
pertise and experience between independent directors to monitor the firm, 
carrying out strategic decision making and control. Thus, we consider the 
following variables, based on the previous literature. 
Qualifications should be a good indicator to determine the ability of 
the independent directors. It is reasonable to hypothesize that, for those 
independent directors who obtained a higher qualification, such as doctoral 
degrees, should possess a better sense of judgment. They should be more 
sensitive to problems that occurred in the companies. Grace et al. (1995) 
also consider the importance of tertiary education as it stands for a crude 
measure for professional status. 
‘ 2 if the independent director 's highest qualification is a 
PhD. 
1 if the independent director's highest qualification is a 
master. 
_ 0 if the independent director's highest qualification is a U U A L I = , , , bachelor. 
—1 if the independent director's highest qualification is 
post-tertiary. 
—2 if the independent director's highest qualification � is secondary or below. 
The professors and scholars, who contribute themselves ONLY into aca-
demic research, without participating in other commercial activities (being 
independent directors as an outside consultant is treated as a special case 
and thus excluded), should be a more reliable group of people to monitor 
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the listed firms vigilantly. They should have a higher incentive to speak 
out when there is something wrong happening in the firms and urge for an 
immediate improvement, given their sound reputation built on their wide 
extent of knowledge and perceived by the general public and shareholders.^ 
A C A D E M I C — / ^ 订 the independent director satisfies the above statement. 
\ 0 z/ otherwise. 
Other professionals, such as lawyers and accountants, always have a code of 
conduct to comply with. Also, their professionalism and knowledge in these 
areas should enable them to trace out the firm's problem more quickly. 
They may possess industry specific human capital that makes them monitor 
the firm effectively (Klein, 1998). Thus, similar to the pure scholars, they 
should also be more willing to issue a negative opinion when the firm is facing 
some problems. On the other hand, Guner, Malmendier and Tate (2007) 
argues that directors with financial expertise may not be willing to make 
the corporate decisions in line with the shareholders' interests. Instead, 
their incentives may be misaligned to benefits that create value for their 
own financial corporation. This is also the reason why we add professional 
services as another set of dummy variables.® For example, 
LAWY _ / 1 订 they are working as lawyers, solicitors. 
\ 0 i/ otherwise. 
However, we do not expect the effect to be as prominent as the pure scholars. 
We also add the engineer as another dummy variable, but since the knowl-
edge of engineering should be less useful in monitoring the firm's corporate 
4 Outside independent directors have incentive to exercise effective monitoring control 
over the board because they have to build reputation as expert in decision control so that 
the external market price them based on their performance (Fama, 1980, Fama and Jensen, 
1983 and Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). This argument can be stressed on professors and 
scholars because reputation will be the price set by the public and academic institutions 
and they have to protect the reputation by exercising effective monitoring. 
5The other variables of professional services are set up in a similar manner. Account 
= 1 if they are registered accountants or auditors, Economist = 1 if they are economists, 
Engineer = 1 if they are engineers. The dummy variables will be equal to 0 if otherwise 
respectively. 
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performance, the coefficient of this variable is expected to be insignificant, 
or even negative. 
Like Kosnik (1987) and Grace et al. (1995), we also want to investigate 
whether the participation of independent directors in other firms' as inside 
board directors, senior managers or independent directors will have an effect 
on the likelihood of issuing negative opinions. They are supposed to be more 
experienced and are more familiar with the operations of listed firms, so that 
they are more likely to detect activities that violate shareholders' interests 
and take disciplinary actions against the senior management. Moreover, 
they have more power in criticizing the firm because even they are dismissed 
due to their issuance of negative opinions that affect companies' images, they 
are still secured by the position from another firm. For this reason, they 
should be having a higher incentive to issue negative opinions. 
{1 if they are presently working in senior manage-ment in other companies. 
0 if otherwise. 
{1 if they have worked as independent directors in other companies. 
0 if otherwise. 
In the case of China, political influence is another dominant factor that has 
to be taken into account. With a more powerful political influence in hand, 
the independent directors will be fearless to issue negative opinions. Also, in 
state owned enterprises, the firm's interest is closely aligned with the state's 
interests. Independent directors with political power will be more willing to 
criticize the companies that are performing badly and harm the state's inter-
ests. Agrawal and Knober (2000) argue that outside directors with political 
background may provide additional advice by their specific knowledge or in-
sight related to the government and that is the reason why political directors 
should matter more in the board. Alternatively, politically-connected inde-
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pendent directors may be less professional and less willing to issue a negative 
opinion because they extract resources from the companies and do not fulfill 
the objective of shareholders' profit maximization (Shleifer and Visny, 1998， 
Fan, Wong and Zhang, 2006). Therefore, those who previously work in the 
government as regional or central officials, or they are the party members, 
will be another set of dummy variables between 0 and 1, represented by 
REG-OFFICIAL, CEN.OFFICIAL, PARTY_MEM respectively. 
Finally, we construct CONSULTANT as we are also interested in indepen-
dent directors that take roles as semi-government consultants. They are not 
working in the government as officials but they do provide advices for the 
central government. They may be more willing to issue a negative opinion; 
however, we do not expect that the effect will be as strong as the indepen-
dent directors that possess real political power defined above. The resume 
also illustrates independent directors' posts in various professional and re-
search societies {zhuanyexuehui / yanjiuhui). Therefore we use a dummy 
variable SOCIETY to indicate whether independent directors have taken at 
least one post in this kind of organizations. 
Logistic regressions will be carried out to check the effect of personal 
characteristics on the issuance of negative opinions. The most desirable sit-
uation will be that we analyze the cases where there are one or more than 
one independent directors issuing negative opinions but the others did not 
in the same firm. However, this kind of sample is expected to be limited. 
Thus, we extend our study by finding out independent directors who did 
not issue any negative opinions from those firms having a similar operating 
performance in the same year and pooling them into the previous dataset 
together to see if there is any consistent result related to personal charac-
teristics and board structure. Besides the control grouping method, we also 
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find out Special Treatment companies and compare the negative opinion 
issuance by their respective independent directors to see if we can yield a 
more robust result. 
4.3 Control Grouping M e t h o d s 
To compare independent directors' likelihood to issue negative opinions in 
controlling corporate performance, we will use the performance-based con-
trol group matching method described by Barber and Lyon (1996) and 
recently adopted by Huson et al. (2004). Using the Barber and Lyon's 
matching process, we can find out a group of control companies with similar 
performance and industry type. To fit our study, we extend this method by 
imposing additional criteria of introducing similarity and year correspon-
dence. We select control groups from the listed firms that were not involved 
in any change in the largest shareholder in the sampling period. 
Our control group method is a one-to-one matching process and it is per-
formed by the following steps. Suppose there are negative opinions issued 
from sample firm in year t. In order to find all possible matches, firstly we 
look at the operating performance (EBIT/Assets) and size (Book Value of 
Total Assets) of all other listed companies in the whole selection sample in 
year £—1. Those that are within ±20% of the operating performance and size 
measures are selected. If there are no such companies, we relax our selection 
criteria from 士20% to ±25% and then the process will be repeated. After 
finding a list of control companies, the one which is in the same industry 
as the sample company will be chosen. Again, if we don't find any possible 
matches, we relax the criteria by another 5% and then repeat the process. A 
company which has the total asset value closest to the sample company will 
be picked up if we cannot find a perfect match using even 士30% bands. If 
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there is more than one company that satisfies the criteria mentioned above, 
we will still choose the one with the value of total assets closest to the 
sample company that issued negative opinions. All repeated items will be 
removed in the control group list in the final step of the matching process. 
Now instead of the original treatment group of companies that contains in-
dependent directors issuing negative opinions, we will have a control group 
of companies with similar performance but without issuing negative opin-
ions. One company in the control group will be paired to another company 
in the treatment group, matched by their similar size and performance. To 
summarize, we have Cn = [ C w . C ^ i . C z i . . . Cn\] representing n treatment 
group companies that some independent directors issued negative opinions. 
By the control grouping method we will find Cj2 = {C12, C22, C'32 . . . CV12} 
representing n control group companies. The personal characteristics of in-
dependent directors only under the specific pair of companies with similar 
firm performance and size will be compared, that is company Cn and Cj2 
with i = j. For example, suppose C\\ is a company in the treatment group, 
with a total number of two independent directors. JDJI issued a negative 
opinion while Dj^ did not. Then we look into C12, the control group com-
pany with respect to C n , and search out all the independent directors in 
C\2- If there are three of them, they will be JD}?，Df�, These five inde-
pendent directors will be assigned to the same group according to the pair 
number i, so that the personal characteristics of the independent directors 
within these two companies will be compared by using Conditional Logistic 
regression. 
Furthermore, instead of our main focus, the personal characteristics of 
independent directors, board composition and regional governance variables 
can also be introduced to examine whether there is any significance in af-
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fecting the monitoring effectiveness, observed by their decision in issuing 
negative opinions. 
4.4 Board Structure 
Numerous studies discuss the board structure and in this thesis we would 
employ several variables to test whether the board structure of a company 
will affect its independent directors in issuing negative opinions, after con-
trolling for corporate performance. To ensure that the measurement of board 
structure between the control group company and the treatment group com-
pany can be compared at the same year, the variables used for characteriz-
ing board structure are one year before the independent directors' issuance 
of negative opinions so that this will be consistent with the control group 
matching process. 
Firstly, whether the chief executive officer of the firm is the chairperson 
or vice-chairperson of the board of director is a common characteristic of 
board structure because the board of directors acts as the main decision 
making and monitoring body. The monitoring role of the board of direc-
tors is compromised if two positions are taken by one person. Therefore, 
we introduce the CE0_IS_CHAIR dummy variable to proxy the corporate 
governance level of a firm. 
‘ 1 if the CEO position and the chairperson or a vice 
chairperson of the board of directors are taken by C E O _ I S _ C H A I R = < ^ J one person. 
� 0 if otherwise. 
Usually the percentage of independent directors, represented by the variable 
IND-RATIO, sitting in the board of directors will be another variable used to 
judge the board independence of the company. With a higher percentage, 
the monitoring power of the board is said to be higher because of the increase 
of higher independence. However, in the case of China, the percentage must 
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reach a certain amount after 2002，which is no longer a practical proxy for 
the strength of corporate governance. In our study we will also employ 
IND-NUMBER , the number of independent directors. We believe that more 
independent directors in the board will definitely be more powerful and they 
will be more likely to issue a negative opinion when there is a problem. The 
responsibility (or risk) of issuing that kind of opinion could be diversified 
among all independent directors. 
4.5 Control Variables 
Finally we use ownership concentration as the control variable to check if 
it will have an effect on monitoring effectiveness. Whether concentrated 
ownership, or concentrated ownership held by the state will lead to better 
corporate governance has been widely debated in the literature (Zheng et 
al.，1998，Xu and Wang, 1999，Li and Wu, 2002 and Sun and Tong, 2003). 
While some of them argue that high ownership will eliminate the free-rider 
problem and improve corporate governance, the other side points out that 
high ownership will favor the tunneling or asset appropriation by the large 
shareholders. Both sides yield significant results in their empirical studies. 
But since high ownership concentration of China's listed companies is one of 
the salient features of corporate governance, and many of the listed compa-
nies' largest shareholders are the government itself, despite the controversies 
of the variable, we will still include several measurements of the ownership 
structure to test its effect on the monitoring effectiveness of independent 
directors in this paper. 
T O P I S H A R E = the largest shareholders‘ shareholding in the firm. 
S H A R E I - I O = the Herfindahl index of the 1st to 10th largest share-
holders ‘shareholding. 
^ f 1 if the largest shareholder is the state itself T O P I J S - S T A T E = „ [0 if otherwise. 
24 
4.6 Regional Governance 
Besides the personal characteristics of independent directors and board 
structure of the respective listed companies, regional governance is another 
main interest of this thesis. The regional disparity affects the level of de-
velopment and marketization progress of companies in different cities and 
provinces. It may also affect the monitoring effectiveness of the independent 
directors. Four different measures of regional governance, from Fan et al. 
(2003), are used in this thesis to see whether regional governance will af-
fect the monitoring effectiveness of the independent directors in companies 
located in different regions. 
Government intervention (GOV_INTERV) will be our first measure of re-
gional governance, constructed by the proportion of entrepreneurs spending 
time in dealing with government's bureaucrats to their working hours. With 
a greater government intervention, enterprises need to spend more time in 
communicating with government officials. The government intervention may 
lead to corruption and collusion between government and companies and as 
a result affect the independent directors in making correct decisions. On 
the other hand, government intervention may also improve the business op-
erations and environment by giving solutions, showing its determination in 
assisting companies' steps towards better marketization. Hence government 
intervention may have positive or negative effects on the likelihood of issuing 
negative opinions. 
The second regional governance variable included is the contract enforce-
ment variable, ENFORCE . Defined as the proportion of lawyer and registered 
accountant to the total population of the specific province, the variable tries 
to capture the quality of legal institutions and law enforcement among dif-
ferent regions in China. Better law enforcement will improve the operations 
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of companies by providing a better protection, and thus a more effective 
monitoring role can be taken by the independent directors. The indepen-
dent directors should be relatively more willing to issue a negative opinion 
under such an environment, compared to those regions having weak law 
enforcement and infant legal institutions. 
The third regional governance variable included is the foreign investment 
variable FORElGN�NVEST, calculated as the ratio of the value of foreign 
investment to the total GDP of the region. Better regional governance, 
indicated by better marketization and more mature factor markets, will 
at t ract more foreign investment. Better marketization should be able to 
affect positively the likelihood of issuing negative opinions. 
The last regional governance variable is the development of non-state 
economy N ON .STATE . It will be represented by using the proportion of 
industrial output from non-state economy® to the whole economy. Similar to 
the foreign investment variable, it indicates the level of marketization among 
different regions. Consequently, we would like to see whether the amount 
of non-state economy development, as a good sign of market development, 
will affect the issuance of negative opinions by independent directors. 
6 Non-state enterprises are enterprises that are not state-owned and state-holding Enter-
prises. State-owned enterprises (originally known as state-run enterprises with ownership 
by the whole society) are non-corporate economic entities registered in accordance with 
the Regulation of the Peoples Republic of China on the Management of Registration of 
Legal Enterprises, where all assets are owned by the state. Included in this category are 
state-owned enterprises, state-funded corporations and state-owned joint-operation enter-
prises. Joint state-private industries and private industries, which existed before 1957， 
were transformed into state-run industries since 1957, and into state-owned industries af-
ter 1992. Statistics on those enterprises are included in the state-owned industries instead 
of being grouped them separately. State-holding enterprises are a sub-classification of 
enterprises with mixed ownership, referring to enterprises where the percentage of state 
assets (or shares by the state) is larger than any other single share holder of the same 
enterprise. 
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4.7 ST Companies 
We try to use another set of data to check the robustness of our results that 
are obtained from control grouping methods. This is a completely different 
approach from control grouping methods with a different dataset facilitated 
and used. The labeling of ST (Special Treatment) companies is a special 
feature in the stock markets in China. The listed companies that have been 
marked as ST or *ST must have violated some of the regulations set by the 
CSRC and can be treated as companies having similar serious operational 
problems. Compared to the control grouping method that uses firm perfor-
mance to indicate companies with problems, a transfer of normal companies 
into ST companies, or even further downgraded as *ST, or being delisted, 
will be a natural experiment instead. As a result labeling ST companies 
is in fact a delisting mechanism taken by the CSRC. The company will be 
marked as ST, if (1) the shareholders' equity is lower than the registered 
capital (the par value of the shares); (2) while auditing a listed firm's fi-
nancial report the auditors issue negative opinions or declare that they are 
unable to issue opinions; (3) there are negative net profits for the last fiscal 
year after the company has been removed from *ST; (4) the operations of 
a company has been seriously affected by natural disasters or other signifi-
cant accidents and it is expected that the company cannot get back to the 
right track in three months; (5) the transactions of the company's major 
banking account has been frozen; (6) the board of directors of the company 
cannot call for a regular meeting and make a decision; (7) Other situations 
that CSRC considers as abnormal and it is necessary for the company to be 
labeled as ST. 
The company will be further downgraded into *ST, which indicates a 
strong signal given to investors about the high risk of the company being 
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delisted, if (1) negative net profits for two consecutive fiscal years; (2) the 
company has been discovered of conducting financial fraud and after the 
correction there are negative net profits for two consecutive fiscal years; (3) 
the company has been discovered of conducting financial fraud and there 
are no corrections within a specified period urged by the CSRC, given that 
the company has been temporarily delisted for two months; (4) the com-
pany does not have their annual reports or semi-annual reports published 
in designated dates, and the company has been temporarily delisted for two 
months. The company will be ultimately delisted from the stock market if 
the situation does not improve after the *ST labeling. 
The ST companies must be a group of companies suffering from serious 
operational problems and the independent directors within those companies 
should be aware of the problems if their role is to take effective monitoring. 
Will there be the case that there are some independent directors issuing a 
negative opinion in a company before being labeled as a ST company while 
in some cases there are no negative opinion issuances before turning into a 
ST company? If that exists, the monitoring effectiveness can also be defined 
as: 
For those independent directors that had issued negative opinions before 
the companies were marked as ST or downgraded into a worse state, their 
monitoring effectiveness should be better than those who had not, given that 
their companies were also marked as ST or downgrading into a worse state 
some years later. By looking into the frequencies of negative opinion issuance 
in all ST companies from 2002 to 2006, we may confirm the previous results 
by analyzing the personal characteristics of independent directors and board 
structure in the ST companies. 
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5 Data 
5.1 Negat ive Opinion Issuance 
We make use of the online d a t a b a s e ^ of Shanghai Stock Exchange to identify 
the issuance of negative opinions in China during 2002 to 2006. We sup-
plement and validate the data by identifying the independent directors and 
obtaining their personal characteristics through the company annual reports 
downloaded from the Shanghai Stock Exchange. 
During the sampling period, there are a total number of 2412 opinions 
issued and posted onto the database of the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Only 
134 opinions are defined as negative by using the matching criteria method 
discussed in the methodology. The negative opinions have involved 144 in-
dependent directors in 45 companies. While in 24 companies all independent 
directors in the board have issued a negative opinion regarding a problem, 
we also observe that in 21 companies only some of the independent directors 
have made an issuance while the others have not. Table 1 summarizes the 
opinion issuances of the independent directors. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
Table 2 shows the types of event that triggered independent directors in 
issuing negative opinions. Most of the negative opinions fell under the cat-
egory of board of directors' internal affairs (10，19.6%)®. While 8 (15.7 %) 
negative opinions are related to both external guarantee performance^ and 
^The credibility records of listed companies: Issuance of independent opinions by in-
dependent directors. Shangshi gongsi chengxin jilu: shangshi gongsi dull dongshi yijian 
fabiao qingkuang (URL: http://www.sse.com.cn/) 
®Example: Xiamen Kim Motor Group Co., Ltd (600686) on 10th November, 2002 by 
Independent Director Lin Xiaojian, "I feel regretful that the board of directors of Xiamen 
Kim Motor Group cannot successfully establish a new year's executives group within 
three months as promised in the previous board meetings. Explanation should be made 
to shareholders in order to protect all investors' rights." 
9Example: Sopo Group (600746) on 27th August, 2004 by Independent Director Ting 
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related party t r a n s a c t i o n s A s s e t appropriation also has a record of 5 out 
of 51 cases (9.8 %). The other events, like asset transfer and capital funding, 
have a number of cases ranging from 3 to 4. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
Table 3 shows the location distribution of sample companies by using their 
registered office location. The geographical distribution of the companies 
from different sets of sample all show diversities. There are a total number 
of nine companies involved in Heilongjiang, Jiangsu and Shanghai, which 
contribute the largest number to the sample by control grouping methods. In 
ST companies, there are 17 companies from Shanghai too, which contributes 
16% to the whole sample. 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
5.2 T h e Personal Characteristics of Independent Directors 
The independent directors' personal characteristics are extracted from the 
resume in annual reports of listed companies in the following manner: 
Bei Zhengming, male, bom in 1957, university bachelor. Work-
ing as a lawyer starting from 1988 to present, in a Shanghai 
united lawyer firm. 
Bei will then fall into the category of LAWY, with QUALI = 0. 
Hunglong, "I feel sorry that the company could not provide us comprehensive information 
about the external guarantee issue in time when we tried to enquire the related informa-
tion. I strongly advise the company to increase the transparency of information flows and 
protect shareholders' interests." 
Example: Xinzhi Technologies Co., Ltd (600503) on 30th April, 2004 by Independent 
Director Gao Weijie, "About the related-party transaction happened within our company, 
as related information about the issue could not be gathered, I refused to issue an opinion 
regarding to this related-party transaction." 
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Kung Jiemin, male, bom in 1937, postgraduate master, regis-
tered economist, lawyer. Past legislative consultant in Shanghai 
Government Agricultural Committee. Present honorary chair-
man of board of directors in an asset evaluation firm from Shang-
hai. 
Kung will count 1 for the dummy variables ECONOMIST, LAWY, CONSUL-
TANT, SEN-MANAGE，with QUALI = 1. 
5.2.1 Treatment Group 
Among 114 independent directors who have issued opinions, 100 (87.72%) 
of them have got a university degree or above, and 60 (52.63%) of them 
have even got a master or a PhD, showing that the qualifications of the 
independent directors are quite high. 37 (32.46%) independent directors are 
professors or senior researchers who only dedicate themselves into academic 
research. 58 (50.88%) of them take part in at least one of the professional 
occupations. The large percentage also shows CSRC's effort in improving 
the quality and ensuring professionalism of the independent directors from 
listed companies. Moreover, 59 (51.75%) independent directors have had a 
political background and 37 (32.45%) of them are party members. Finally, 
33 (23.68%) independent directors are from senior management while only 
9 (7.89%) of them are taking the role of independent directors in other 
companies. 
When we take the other 29 independent directors in the sample compa-
nies that have made no opinion issuance into account, a proportion decrease 
in several fields, such as senior management, central officials and party mem-
bers, is observed. That means those independent directors play a less active 
role in senior management and the government. On the other hand, they 
31 
are relatively more active in the professional and academic societies. 
5.2.2 Control Group 
By the control grouping method discussed in the methodology, 45 matched 
companies are successfully found. Based on these companies we searched out 
129 more independent directors. A comparison of personal characteristics 
of independent directors between the treatment group and control group 
is summarized in Table 4. The qualifications of independent directors in 
the control group are relatively lower, though the percentage of obtaining 
a doctorial degree is slightly higher. Additionally, if we examine the other 
three major characteristics of the independent directors from two groups, 
the independent directors in the control group all have a smaller proportion 
than that in the treatment group. The descriptive statistics already give us a 
simple picture in mind that independent directors in the control group may 
be less eligible than those in the treatment group if the ability of independent 
directors depends on these personal characteristics. 
A more detailed summary about the personal characteristics is presented 
in Table 4 and Table 5. 
[Insert Table 4 and 5 Here] 
5 .3 Board Structure 
The data describing the board structure, together with the control variables 
introduced in next section, are obtained from CSMAR (China Stock Mar-
ket and Accounting Research), Database of Financial data and Marketing 
Data of China Capital Market. The d u m m y variable CE0_IS_CHAIR will 
be equal to 1 if the chairman or vice-chairman of the board of directors is 
also the chief executive officer of a company. The mean value for treatment 
32 
group is 0.04，while the value is 0.22 in the control group. This shows that 
more independent directors of companies in the control group are facing the 
duality case. 
The dummy variable LND_NUMBER simply counts the number of inde-
pendent directors sitting in the board of directors of the company. It has a 
mean value of 3.44 in the treatment group while the number in the control 
group is smaller, with a value of 3.02. This may show that the monitoring 
effectiveness of the treatment group will be larger than that in the treat-
ment group as they enjoy a relatively larger independence and can take a 
monitoring role more efficiently. 
5.4 Control Variables 
Finally, we have the variable to measure the ownership concentration of 
the company. The mean value of T O P 1 SHARE, indicating the largest share-
holder's shareholding, in both the treatment group and control group is 
similar, from 0.40 to 0.43 respectively. TOP1_IS_STATE is the dummy vari-
able tha t equals to 1 if the largest shareholder is the state itself. The mean 
value of this variable in both groups is around 0.68，meaning that nearly 
70% of sample companies are controlled by the government. Finally, we use 
S H A R E I - I O to calculate the sum of squares of the 1st large shareholder's 
shareholding to the 10th large shareholder's shareholding. The mean value 
of -1.79 in t reatment group with a range from -3.61 to -0.64 is observed. 
The value is slightly lower in control group, which is equal to -1.62, and 
with a range from -4.24 to -0.58. Based on the descriptive statistics, we do 
not observe any big difference in the ownership structure. 
Table 6 describes the board structure and control variables in detail. 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
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5.5 Regional Governance 
We treat regional governance indices as time invariant as it should not vary 
so much over time. Regional governance indices of 2002 from Fan et al. 
(2003) will be used in our analysis. The indices usually range from 0 to 
10.11 We can see from Table 7 that the four regional governance variables 
have a large variation across different regions. For example, the government 
intervention index varies from 0 in Jilin to 15.78 in Hainan. More developed 
regions like Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong have the index ranging from 8 
to 14. The foreign capital index varies greatly as well, from -0.14 in Tibet to 
6.92 in Jiangsu. More economically developed regions as mentioned before 
have the index ranging from 3.91 to 6.95，representing a higher proportion 
of foreign capital investing in these regions. The contract enforcement index 
also has a very large dispersion among different provinces and cities, from 
-0.12 in Tibet to 28.11 in Beijing. More developed regions have a range from 
4.16 to 28.11 respectively. The non-state economy development varies from 
1.00 in Xinjiang to 11.31 in Zhejiang. 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
5.6 S T Companies 
There are 134 companies that have been marked as ST from 2002 to 2006. 
The da ta are collected from the annual Fact-Book published by the Shang-
hai Stock Exchange. We eliminate those companies that were already ST 
companies in 2002 while at the same time they did not downgrade into a 
worse s tate throughout these five years since we will not be able to figure 
Ult is possible to have a index greater than 10 or less than 0 because the indices are 
always adjusted by its performance in the base year by {Vi - Vmin)/{Vmax - Vmin) x 
10, where Vi stands for the governance indicator this year, and Vmax and Vmin are the 
maximum and minimum of the specific indicator among all provinces in the base year, 
and that is 1999 in the study of Fan et al. 
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out starting from which year the state of the company has been worsened. 
Only 113 companies left^^. Table 8 shows the descriptive statistics of ST 
companies. 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
The distribution of negative opinion issuance in ST companies will be illus-
trated as follows. We can see that only 13 companies have negative opinions 
issued by their independent directors around the time of being labeled as a 
"problematic" company.^^ Half of the issuances are in year 0 or onwards, 
showing tha t many independent directors only made their issuance after the 
problem of their respective companies are exposed to the public. This is 
probably not a kind of effective monitoring, but we still treat it as an action 
taken which is better than nothing. Table 9 summarizes the details. 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
Here we will modify the OPINION variable a little bit by the following con-
struction, adding a rank of 2 in differentiating the time of negative opinion 
issuance by the independent directors: 
‘ 2 if the independent directors of ST companies issued a ne-
gative opinion before year 0, such as -1, -2, etc. 
O P I N I O N — 1 the independent directors of ST companies issued a ne-
gative opinion in year 0 or after. 
0 if the independent directors of ST companies never � issued a negative opinion. 
Table 10 summarizes the relationship between the level of negative opinion 
issuance and the number of ST companies and their respective independent 
directors involved. Only 13 independent directors out of 352 have issued a 
i^Due to limitations of data, only 109 companies are used in the analysis. 
i3For example, Zhung Jiang Properties (600053), Yuan Da Technologies (600181) and 
Gao Tong Mobile (600182) are the one of the few ST companies that had negative opinions 
issued by their independent directors. 
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negative opinion before the companies have been downgraded by the CSRC 
while a little bit more independent directors, with a number of 17, issued a 
negative opinion on or after the downgrading has been taking place. The 
scarcity in a count of total cases is comparable to the frequency of negative 
opinions issued by independent directors taking all listed companies as a 
whole, indicating the monitoring weaknesses of independent directors. 
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
The personal characteristics of independent directors and the board struc-
ture of the ST companies are summarized in the following tables. To com-
pare the board structure for our analysis, the data of two years before a 
company downgrading into a worse state {t — 1) are used so that we can 
examine whether the board structure before the announcement of being la-
beled as ST companies or even worse will have an effect on the likelihood 
of independent directors issuing negative opinions. We can observe that 
the distributions of values among different variables are generally similar 
to those collected by control grouping methods. We will run the Ordered 
Logistic regressions to see if similar results by using the control grouping 
methods can be obtained. 
[Insert Table 11，12 and 13 Here] 
6 Empirical Results 
6.1 Test ing M e a n s of T w o Samples 
Before carrying out Logistic regressions, we are also interested to see if 
there is any difference between the means of a specific variable among the 
treatment group and the control group. The descriptive statistics given in 
section 5 only gives us a preliminary impression about the distribution of 
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data. In order to have a deeper understanding of the variables in a statistical 
perspective, we first conduct a simple two tailed t-test of two samples. The 
null hypothesis will be that the difference in the two means is equal to 
zero. Rejecting the null hypothesis indicates that the means of a specific 
variable between two groups is not the same, justified by a conventional 
level of significance. If there is no variation found between these two groups 
of samples, the independent directors that have issued negative opinions 
do not have a significant difference from those that have not. Moreover 
their belonged companies do not have difference in corporate governance or 
regional governance after the corporate performance has been controlled. 
The test is summarized in Table 14. We can see that ECONOMIST, 
CEN_OFFICIAL, PARTY-MEM, C E O _ I S _ C H A I R a n d IND_NUMBER are all s t a -
tistically significant at the 5% significance level, while IND.RATIO is statis-
tically significance at the 10% significant level. 
[Insert Table 14 Here] 
6 .2 Event S t u d y 
Since we have the report date of the negative opinion issuance from the 
database of Shanghai Stock Exchange, we try to perform the standard event 
studyi4 to see whether there is a significant impact on the stock market dur-
ing the date of announcement. To see the market event in various durations, 
14 To conduct an event study, the abnormal return of stocks after the announcement 
are calculated. First of all the stock return, Ru, is defined as the difference between the 
stock closing price on day t and i - 1, in logarithms, i.e. Ru = ln{Pit/Pi,t-i), where Pu 
is the closing price of stock i on day t . The abnormal return, A R u , will then be equal to 
Rit — E{Rit/Xt), where Xt normal returns for time period t. By assuming a stable linear 
relation between the market and stock return (Fama, 1976), we can find out E(Rit/Xt) by 
estimating the model E{Rit/Xt) = ai + PiRmt, where Rmt represents the market return 
at time t. Then the abnormal returns, and the cumulative abnormal return, CARi, can 
also be calculated by CARi = •^•^tt, which is the sum of abnormal returns over the 
event window. 
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we facilitate the following event windows around the announcement day (day 
0): (-1’ 1)，（-3’ 3)，（-5，5), (-10，10) and (-10, 120). 
We have found 45 negative issuances cases and identified 45 announce-
ment dates. By using 120-day estimation window (-150，-30), we do not find 
any significant cumulative abnormal returns in using various event windows, 
even when we modified the event window to (0, t), or conducted the event 
study again by separating the negative issuances cases into different cate-
gories by using the event window (0，3), which shows the highest t-value in 
previous event study analysis. Therefore, the stock market is probably not 
affected by the announcement of issuing negative opinions. We observe nega-
tive cumulative abnormal returns in cases of external guarantee performance, 
asset appropriation and regulation violations. Though statistically insignifi-
cant, they are common severe operational problems in Chinese corporations 
and it may be one of the reasons that the negative opinions regarding these 
issues will affect negatively the stock prices. However, the sample sizes in 
some categories are too small and thus the respective hypothesis testing is 
also questionable. 
[Insert Table 15 and 16 Here] 
6 .3 Logistic Regressions 
In this section we will present the empirical results from the Logistic re-
gression analysis. The ultimate goal of the regression analysis is to find if 
there is any key determinant of the monitoring effectiveness of independent 
directors. Empirical results for each category will be discussed first while 
the regression with all kinds of variables will be shown at the last part of 
this section. 
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6.3.1 The Personal Characteristics of Independent Directors 
We will first run a Logistic regression by using the treatment group only to 
see if there is any specific personal characteristic affecting the issuance of 
negative opinions. The p-value of the model is 0.05 and the Pseudo R? is 
0.14，which suggest the model is a feasible model. The variable foreign and 
consult are dropped automatically due to perfect prediction in the model. 
Quite a number of variables are estimated with signs which are under our 
prediction. For example, the one who has got higher qualifications, or those 
who are purely academic researchers will be more willing to issue negative 
opinions. Holding a position in the senior management, having a politi-
cal background and being a consultant of government, also favor issuance 
of negative opinions. However, we are surprised to see that the sign for 
professionals are all negative. Being an independent director and taking a 
role in professional/research societies also decrease the likelihood of issuing 
a negative opinion. Like previous literature we cannot find any significant 
results in the independent directors' occupation. This shows that within the 
company the occupation factor will not be a crucial factor in judging the 
issuance of negative opinions. 
Only SEN_MANAGE is statistically significant within the 10% level. Af-
ter we drop the most insignificant variables one by one, the best model 
would have the following variables included: ACADEMIC, SEN—MANAGE, 
CEN_OFFICIAL, SOCIETY , in which ACADEMIC is marginally significant in 
10% significance level. This confirms our first hypothesis, which is quite 
inspiring, as we find tha t the likelihood of issuing negative opinions by the 
monitoring committees is affected by the independent directors' personal 
characteristics. The results are summarized in Table 17. 
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[Insert Table 17 Here] 
We will then include the control group and conduct the Logistic regression 
analysis again. Because the control group companies are found based on 
1-to-l matching method, we will use Conditional Logistic regression to com-
pare the effects of personal characteristics on issuance of negative opinions 
by independent directors in grouped pairs according to their companies. The 
result is generally similar to the previous regression unless there are no more 
significant variables in the backgrounds of professional services and senior 
management. Nevertheless, in the best model, ACADEMIC, CEN.OFFICIAL 
and SOCIETY are still included. It is remarkable to see that whether the one 
is a communist party member is also a determining factor of the likelihood 
of issuing negative opinions between companies with similar corporate per-
formance. Together with the high significance observed in the variable of 
central officer, political influence is probably the most dominant factor in 
judging the monitoring effectiveness of independent directors. This is reason-
able because the law and regulations of China have not been fully developed 
and a higher political influence often brings the independent directors more 
power to issue a negative opinion, compared to other independent directors 
in the company with similar performance and firm size. It is also possible 
that they are put into the board of directors to ensure effective external 
monitoring. 
[Insert Table 18 Here] 
6.3.2 Board Structure 
We want to justify the results obtained above by adding the board structure 
characteristics into the model to see if there will be a large change to the 
coefficients and signs of the variable. As stated in the hypothesis and the 
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literature review, a more independent board should be related to a better 
monitoring effectiveness, shown by the previous studies. Therefore we argue 
that a higher independence of the board should also provide a better envi-
ronment to make the independent directors more willing to issue a negative 
opinion when there is a problem, given that their companies' performance 
are similar. 
Conditional Logistic regression with independent variables containing 
only common board structure measurements and binary dependent vari-
ables representing issuance of negative opinions is carried out. Due to the 
high correlation between IND.NUMBER and IND.RATIO, T O P I S H A R E and 
S H A R E 1 _ 1 0 , we separate the variables and estimate the model by including 
one from two pairs of variables each time. 
First of all, when the chairman of the board of directors is at the same 
time the chief executive officer of the company, the independence of the 
board is greatly affected. We find statistically significant results in the 
variable C E O JS_CHAIR in all estimated models, meaning that independent 
directors will be less willing to issue a negative opinion when there is such 
kind of concurrent situation taken by a person. 
Secondly, the structure of the board is also another proxy in measuring 
the board independence. More independent directors sitting in the board 
would probably mean a higher monitoring power and independence. We use 
the number of independent directors in our analysis and we find statistically 
significant results regarding this variable which indicates that independent 
directors will be more willing to issue a negative opinion when there are more 
independent directors sitting in the board. In addition, the IND .RATIO is 
also statistically significant, showing that the ratio of independent directors 
sitting in the board of directors has a positive relationship to the likelihood 
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of issuing negative opinions by independent directors. 
Finally, in the set of control variables, we find that the concentration of 
ownership does not yield any statistically significant results. The coefficients 
of T O P 1 SHARE from Model (3a) and (4a) are highly insignificant and incon-
clusive in signs. In Models (3b) and (4b), SHARE1_10 are used but it is also 
insignificant. This is why we do not include both variables in Models (5a) 
and (5b). On the other hand, SHARE1_10 is significant in Models (4a), (4b) 
and (5b), showing that state ownership will increase the likelihood of issuing 
negative opinions by the independent directors. State ownership probably 
improves the corporate environment for a better monitoring taken by the 
independent directors. On the whole, according to the first two variables 
it confirms our second hypothesis that a more independent board structure 
will motivate a better monitoring effectiveness of the independent directors. 
[Insert Table 19 Here] 
6.3.3 Regional Governance 
We want to see whether regional governance has an effect on the monitoring 
effectiveness of the independent directors stated from the previous hypoth-
esis. For this reason, like the previous sets of variables, we also only include 
four regional governance indices defined above and run a Conditional Lo-
gistic regression by control grouping methods. We separate the regional 
governance indices one by one and run a simple regression first. Although 
NON_STATE, FOREIGN and GOV—INTERV are not statistically significant, the 
variable ENFORCE show strongly positive significant results, with a p-value 
of 0.00，and the result is still consistent in model (6e), when altogether four 
regional governance variables are included in the same model. This shows 
that better regional governance, with a higher degree of contract enforce-
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ment and thus a stronger protection of companies will improve the business 
environment and as a result increase the likelihood of issuing negative opin-
ions by independent directors. 
[Insert Table 20 Here] 
6.3.4 Full Set of Variables 
Finally, in this section we will investigate the likelihood of negative opin-
ion issuance by independent directors by including both measurements of 
the independent directors' personal characteristics，the board structure and 
regional governance of companies. Related variables will be pooled into a 
set of explanatory variables to see if there is any improvement in the fitting 
of the model together with consistent result in the statistically significant 
variables yielded in the previous analysis. 
Table 21 and 22 shows the Conditional Logistic regression results with 
the dependent variable defined as the binary outcome of negative opinion 
issuance. The stepwise inclusion strategy is used to choose the best-fitting 
regressors. Our selected model has the following independent variables in-
cluded: 
OPINION^ = f (ENGINEER, SEN_MANAGE, REG_OFFICIAL, CEN.OFFICIAL, 
PARTY_MEM, SOCIETY, T O P I S H A R E , CEO_IS_CHAIR, IND.RATIO, NON_STATE, 
ENFORCE) 
p-value = 0.000 x^(lO) = 53.93 Pseudo B? = 0.3153 
ENGINEER is the dummy variable which takes 1 if the independent di-
rector has taken engineer as his or her professional career and 0 if other-
wise. The marginal insignificant variable is statistically significant in the 
full model, showing that the effect is more prominent after controlling the 
effect of the board structure and regional governance. The coefficient means 
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that engineers will be less willing to issue a negative opinion when there 
is a problem. This is also within our expectation because the professional 
knowledge of an engineer is not relevant to the ability needed by an indepen-
dent director to monitor the firm and make strategic decisions. The same 
explanation also applies to the case of holding positions in professional and 
academic societies. 
Having a present position in the senior management of other companies 
also has a significant effect in determining the negative opinion issuance. 
The sign of the coefficient of SEN_MANAGE is positive, showing that they 
are more willing to issue opinions. Their incentive and ability to monitor the 
company is higher, given that they are more experienced in the operation of 
companies. They are more likely to detect activities that violate sharehold-
ers' interest and take disciplinary action against the senior management. 
The political status of an independent director is found to be very crucial 
in the issuance of negative opinions. Being a government official before 
and a communist party member both increase the likelihood of issuing a 
negative opinion. It is believed that under the one party ruling system 
in China, having such political power must give the one more autonomy 
and independence to monitor the firm vigilantly, ignoring the threat by 
the other parties within the company. Independent directors with political 
background can provide additional advices by their specific knowledge or 
insight related to the government. They can carry out effective external 
monitoring if they are placed within the board by the government. 
The variables representing board structure adopted in the model is to 
see if the board environment can affect the monitoring effectiveness of in-
dependent directors, instead of the personal characteristics. We find that a 
company with more independent board structure will induce the indepen-
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dent director to be more likely to issue negative opinions. The positive effect 
of number of independent directors, the ratio of independent directors and 
the negative effect of the concurrent position as the chief executive officer 
and chairman of board of directors confirm the result. 
For the regional governance indices, we separate foreign capital from 
the other three regional governance variables by different models due to 
high multicollineaxity. We can see that except FOREIGN and GOV—INTERV, 
NON_STATE and ENFORCE show statistically significant results. Their signs 
are all positive, showing that better regional governance, represented by 
better company protection and more developed legislative system, will be 
more able to induce independent directors in issuing a negative opinion. 
We also find that a higher shareholding by the largest shareholder will 
give a more favorable environment for independent directors to monitor the 
firm vigilantly. This may be due to an improvement of corporate governance, 
but since there is no conclusion on the relationship between monitoring 
effectiveness and ownership structure, it may also be due to some other 
unknown reasons. Detailed results can be found in Table 21 and Table 22. 
[Insert Table 21 and 22 Here] 
In summary, the final regression result is generally consistent with the pre-
vious Logistic regression analysis in which only one set of variables is taken 
every time. It shows that the issuance of negative opinions by indepen-
dent directors is determined by the personal characteristics. There will be 
a higher likelihood of issuing negative opinions, given that the board inde-
pendence and regional governance levels are higher. 
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6.4 Checking Robustness of Results by Using ST Companies 
We have already obtained significant results from the Conditional Logistic 
regression by one-to-one matching process and now we want to confirm our 
findings by using the data set of ST companies. We try to compare whether 
the likelihood of negative opinion issuance of all independent directors in ST 
companies only will be affected by the personal characteristics of indepen-
dent directors and also the board structure of the company 1 year before the 
company is downgraded into a worse state. Multi-Ordered Logistic regres-
sion is used and the findings are summarized as table 23. We can see that 
most of the variables, including SEN_MANAGE, CEN_OFFICIAL, PARTY_MEM 
and CEO_IS_CHAIR remain significant that confirm our findings. ACADEMIC 
becomes statistically significant also in the 10% level, showing that those 
who are purely academic researchers will be more willing to issue a negative 
opinion. Two regional governance indices, N ON .STATE and ENFORCE , are 
also highly statistically significant at the 95% interval with correct positive 
signs. Unfortunately, neither IND_NUMBER nor IND_RATIO is statistically 
significant. Although the sign of SOCIETY and ENGINEER are correct, they 
are not very statistically significant, especially ENGINEER , which is highly 
insignificant. This may be due to the limitation of the data as there is only 
a few of independent directors issuing negative opinions in ST companies. 
The variation and the significance of the results will solely depend on the 
personal characteristics and board structure of the limited number of data 
points. On the whole, the use of ST companies is still constructive, as it 
gives more solid evidence justifying the effect of personal characteristics on 
the likelihood of negative opinion issuance. 
[Insert Table 23 Here] 
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7 Summary and Conclusion 
We use the issuance of negative opinions by independent directors to cap-
ture their monitoring effectiveness. Based on the assumptions, the issuance 
of negative opinions means a more vigilant monitoring and a more strategic 
decision-making taken by the independent directors than the others, given 
that the performance of companies is similar. In this thesis, we analyze the 
negative opinion issuances by independent directors of Chinese listed com-
panies between 2002 and 2006. During this sampling period, 134 negative 
opinions are found in 45 companies, involving 144 independent directors. 
Slightly adapted from Carcello and Neal's model, we try to test whether 
the monitoring effectiveness of independent directors will be affected by the 
personal characteristics to monitor the firm together with the board struc-
ture. We use personal characteristics, like education, career and political 
background, which can be shown and collected in data form to measure the 
human capital of the independent directors to carry out external monitor-
ing and strategic decision marking, while ownership structure of the firm 
are used to control the variation of corporate environment. 
To compare the monitoring effectiveness of the independent directors 
effectively, we employ the control group (one-to-one matching) methods to 
target companies with a similar firm size, industry area and firm perfor-
mance. 
The Conditional Logistic regression is used to test the determinants of 
issuance of negative opinions within the grouped pairs. The major contri-
bution of our study is that we find the personal characteristics have statis-
tically significant effect in explaining the issuance of negative opinions by-
independent directors in China. To our knowledge, this finding is new to the 
47 
previous literature. Being an engineer or taking a position in the professional 
or academic societies decreased the likelihood of issuing a negative opinion, 
because the related knowledge and abilities do not apply in monitoring the 
company. Also, the professional careers and workload decrease the time that 
independent directors spent on the company. On the other hand, significant 
results are found in the independent directors being a present member in a 
senior management and a past member in the government as officers or party 
members. A more independent board structure also increase the likelihood 
of issuing negative opinions, as we observed statistically significant positive 
result on the number of independent directors and statistically significant 
negative result on the concurrent position of CEO/chairman of board of di-
rectors. Board with more independence and companies located in locations 
with a better regional governance will motivate the independent directors 
to monitor the firm effectively and make a more objective decision. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Negat ive Opinion Issuance, Descriptive Statistics 
Number of Opinions Issued Percentage % 
N O N - N E G A T I V E 2 2 7 8 9 4 . 4 
NEGATIVE 1 3 4 5 . 6 
T O T A L 2 M 
Number of 
Number of Companies Independent Directors 
Issued Not-Issued 
A L L 2 4 7 8 0 
N O T A L L 2 1 3 7 2 9 
T O T A L 4 5 115 2 9 
Table 2: Negat ive Opinion Issuance, by Categories 
Categories Negative Opinions Related Percentage % 
Board of Directors' Internal Affairs 10 19.6 
External Guarantee Performance 8 15.7 
Related Party Transactions 8 15.7 
Asset Appropriation 5 9.8 
Violation of Regulations 4 7.8 
Asset Transfer 3 5.9 
Capital Funding 3 5.9 
Auditing Matters 3 5.9 
Miscellaneous 7 13.7 
Total “ 51 m 
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Table 3: Sample Companies Location Distribution 
n • 1 , ^rr^ r .. Treatment Group Control Group ST Companies Registered Office Location number % number % number % 
Anhui 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Beijing 6 14 1 2 4 4 
Chongqing 1 2 1 2 2 2 
Fujian 1 2 0 0 4 4 
Gansu 0 0 1 2 2 2 
Guangdong 1 2 3 7 3 3 
Guizhou 1 2 0 0 0 0 
Hainan 1 2 0 0 4 4 
Hebei 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Heilongjiang 2 5 7 16 9 8 
Henan 1 2 1 2 1 1 
Hubei 1 2 2 5 7 6 
Hunan 2 5 1 2 3 3 
Inner Mongolia 1 2 0 0 1 1 
Jiangsu 5 11 4 9 3 3 
Jiangxi 1 2 0 0 1 1 
Jilin 1 2 2 5 1 1 
Liaoning 1 2 2 5 8 7 
Ningxia 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Qinghai 0 0 2 5 1 1 
Shaanxi 1 2 1 2 1 1 
Shandong 2 5 1 2 9 8 
Shanghai 4 9 5 11 17 16 
Shanxi 2 5 1 2 5 5 
Sichuan 2 5 3 7 6 6 
Tianjin 1 2 2 5 3 3 
Tibet 0 0 1 2 3 3 
Xinjiang 0 0 1 2 5 5 
Yunnan 4 9 0 0 1 1 
Zhejiang 2 5 2 5 2 2 
Total 44 i S 44 100 i m 100 
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Table 4: Personal Characteristics, Descriptive Statistics I 
Each column contains the distribution of observations among variables taking different values within a specific 
sample group. Treatment Group 1 contains independent directors that have issued a negative opinion and 
they belong to the listed companies labelled as Treatment Group. Treatment Group 2 contains also the 
independent directors that have not issued a negative opinion but they are active in the same company 
with some independent directors in Treatment Group 1. Percentages are also given besides the number of 
observations to indicate the relative proportion. 
Treatment Treatment Control Treatment + 
Variables / Group group 1 group 2 Group Control Group 
(i=115) (i=lU) (i=129) (i=273) 
-2 13 11.40 16 11.19 12 9.30 29 10.56 
-1 1 0.88 1 0.69 12 9.30 12 4.58 
Quali = { 0 40 35.09 58 40.56 29 22.48 88 32.39 
1 28 24.56 31 21.68 38 29.46 67 24.65 
2 32 28.07 37 25.87 38 29.46 76 27.82 
, , . , 0 78 67.54 102 70.63 92 71.32 192 70.42 A R*^  RI ^ TTI 1 C* J 
_ 1 1 37 32.46 42 29.37 37 28.68 81 29.58 
_ 0 99 85.96 121 83.91 112 86.82 233 85.21 
awy = { 1 16 14.04 23 16.08 17 13.18 40 14.79 
^ , 0 85 73.68 107 74.13 95 73.64 200 73.24 A /^ /^ oiini" — J 
—1 1 30 26.32 37 25.87 34 26.36 73 26.76 
— 0 109 94.74 133 92.31 114 88.37 248 90.85 
ngineer = { ^ g 5.26 22 7.69 15 11.63 25 9.15 
0 100 86.84 124 86.01 122 94.57 245 89.79 
Economist = { ^ ^^ 13 16 20 13.99 7 5.43 28 10.21 
0 88 76.32 116 80.42 102 79.07 219 80.28 
Sen_manage = { ^ � 2 3 . 6 8 28 19.58 27 20.93 54 19.72 
. _ 0 103 89.47 128 88.81 115 89.15 243 89.08 
Reg_official = { ^ ^^ 10.53 16 11.19 14 10.85 30 10.92 
— 0 101 87.72 129 89.51 126 97.67 251 93.31 
Cen_official = {丄 丄^  12.28 15 10.49 3 2.33 22 6.69 
• 0 106 92.11 130 90.20 120 93.02 255 91.90 
Ind_direct = { ^ ^ 7.39 14 9.79 9 6.98 18 8.10 
0 111 96.49 140 97.20 124 96.12 264 96.83 
Foreign—invest = { ^ ^ 3.51 4 2.79 5 3.88 9 3.17 
0 78 67.54 99 68.53 107 82.95 207 75.70 
Party _mem = { ^ 37 32.45 45 31.47 22 17.05 66 24.30 
_ 0 99 85.96 124 86.01 103 79.84 228 83.45 
Consultant = { ^ 14.03 20 13.99 26 20.16 45 16.55 
� . , 0 94 81.57 115 79.72 96 74.42 211 77.46 Society = i 
1 1 21 18.42 29 20.24 33 25.58 62 22.54 
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Table 5: Personal Characteristics, Descriptive Statistics II 
COMBINED.QU is constructed by the sum of dummy variables ACCOUNT, LAWY, ECONOMIST, ENGINEER. It 
will take 1 if the sum is larger than or equal to 1, and take 0 if otherwise. C0MBINED_P0 ( PARTY_MEM + 
REG-OFFICIAL + CEN-OFFICIAL) and C0MBINED_H0 (SEN-MANAGE + IND_DIRECT) are also constructed in a 
similar manner. Each column from a specific group contains the number of observations and the percentage 
respectively. 
Treatment Treatment Control Treatment + 
Variables / Group group 1 group 2 Group Control Group 
(i=115) (i=144) (i=129) (i=273) 
。 ， . ， , 0 56 49.12 66 46.15 63 48.84 129 47.18 Combmed_qu = i 
4 ^ 1 58 50.88 78 53.85 66 51.16 144 52.82 
_ 0 55 48.24 75 51.74 87 67.44 162 59.51 
om me -po = { ^ ^^ 51.75 69 48.25 42 32.56 111 40.49 
^ 」， , 0 82 71.05 105 72.73 95 73.64 202 73.94 Combmea_no = •{ 
1 1 32 28.94 39 27.27 34 26.36 71 26.06 
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Table 6: Board Structure and Control Variables: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables / Group Treatment Group Control Group 
number % number % 
� A . u • r 0 43 0.9565 35 0.7778 
1 2 0.0435 10 0.2222 
Treatment Group 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ind_number 3.4565 0.9822 2 6 
IncLratio 0.3338 0.0588 0.1818 0.5 
Control Group 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ind_number 3.0222 1.0111 1 6 
Ind_ratio 0.3145 0.7197 0.1 0.4286 
Treatment Group 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
TopIshare 0.3974 0.1658 0.1433 0.7260 
Sharel-lO -1.7976 0.7181 -3.614 -0.6400 
Control Group 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
TopIshare 0.4341 0.1644 0.0644 0.7482 
Sharel_10 -1.6210 0.7263 -4.2480 -0.5801 
Treatment Group Control Group 
number % number % 
, 0 15 0.3261 14 0.3111 
Topl_is.state={丄 0.6739 31 0.6889 
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Table 7: Regional Governance Indices 
Location Foreign Government Non-state Contract 
Investment Intervention Development Enforcement 
Anhui 0.65 0.01 4.91 1.5 
Beijing 3.81 8 4.72 28.11 
Chongqing 0.59 4.13 4.38 2.83 
Pujian 5.9 9.66 9.49 2.78 
Gansu 0.25 1.65 2.74 1.6 
Guangdong 6.95 13.62 10.52 4.16 
Guangxi 1.11 5.36 4.45 0.91 
Guizhou 0.1 1.82 2.42 0.44 
Hainan 6.1 15.78 4.24 2.64 
Hebei 0.8 7.26 6.63 1.71 
Heilongjiang 0.53 3.06 1.53 3 
Henan 0.34 3.03 5.74 1.59 
Hubei 1.97 5.96 4.39 2.85 
Hunan 1.39 5.85 4.63 1.55 
Inner Mongolia 0.61 5.18 2.66 2.59 
Jiangsu 6.92 11.31 10 2.89 
Jiangxi 3.11 0.38 2.52 1.24 
Jilin 0.66 0 1.78 2.65 
Liaoning 4.46 1.95 4.09 4.03 
Ningxia 0.35 5.96 3.52 2.98 
Qinghai 0.88 9.62 1.12 2.17 
Shaanxi 1.16 13.16 1.96 2.36 
Shandong 3.16 3.5 7.95 2.44 
Shanghai 5.67 14 6.57 12.82 
Shanxi 0.63 4.26 4.06 3.73 
Sichuan 0.7 3.98 5.41 2.03 
Tianjin 5.54 5.77 8.56 6.92 
Tibet -0.14 13 2.58 -0.12 
Xinjiang -0.05 6.46 1 3.13 
Yunnan 0.23 5.98 1.65 1.69 
Zhejiang 2.76 U f ^ 3.54 
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Table 8: ST companies, Descriptive Statistics 
Year (downgrading into a worse state) Number of ST companies 
2 0 0 3 2 2 
2 0 0 4 2 7 
2 0 0 5 21 
2 0 0 6 4 2 
TOTAL 1 1 3 
Table 9: Negative Opinion Issuance and Company Status Changes 
In Year before downgrading Number of ST Companies that had a 
into a worse state Negative Opinion Issuance 
+ ( A F T E R ) 2 
0 5 
- 1 2 
- 2 2 
- 3 2 
N E V E R 1 0 0 
T O T A L 1 1 3 
Table 10: The Level of Negative Opinion Issuance, the Respective Companies and 
Independent Directors Involved 
O P I N I O N Number of ST Companies Number of independent 
directors involved 
0 1 0 0 ( 8 8 . 5 0 % ) 3 2 2 ( 9 1 . 5 8 % ) 
1 7 ( 6 . 1 9 % ) 17 ( 4 . 8 3 % ) 
2 6 ( 5 . 3 1 % ) 1 3 ( 3 . 6 9 % ) 
T O T A L 1 1 3 3 5 2 
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Table 11: Personal Characteristics (ST Companies), Descriptive Statistics I 
Variables / Group ST Group (i=352) 
-2 41 10.56 % 
-1 22 4.58 % 
Quali = { 0 107 32.39 % 
1 103 24.65 % 
2 79 27.82 % 
Academic = { 0 266 70.42 % 
1 86 29.58 % 
T , 0 307 85.21 % Lawy = { � ^ 1 45 14.79 % 
, , , 0 240 73.24 % Account = { � 1 112 26.76 % 
^ . r 0 323 90.85 % Engineer = { � 1 1 29 9.15 % 
^ . , , 0 309 89.79 % Economist = { ^ I 1 43 10.21 % 
„ , 0 275 80.28 % Sen—manage = { 一 ^ „„ ^ ^ 1 77 19.72 % 
D ^ . , , 0 302 89.08 % 
Reg_official = {丄 ^^ io.92 % 
门 ^ . , . 0 333 93.31 % Cen_omcial = { ^ L 1 19 6.69 % 
T J ‘ , 0 314 91.90 % Ind_direct = { � 1 1 38 8.10 % 
^ r 0 273 75.70 % Party-mem = { … 八…。rw ^ 1 79 24.30 % 
� , ^ , 0 299 83.45 % Consultant = { … ” " r w 1 53 16.55 % 
� . r 0 280 77.46 % 
= { 1 72 22.54 % 
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Table 12: Personal Characteristics (ST Companies) , Descript ive Statist ics II 
COMBINED-QU is constructed by the sum of dummy variables ACCOUNT, LAWY, ECONOMIST, ENGINEER. It 
will take 1 if the sum is larger than or equal to 1, and take 0 if otherwise. COMBINED_PO ( PARTY_MEM + 
REG-OFFICIAL + CEN-OFFICIAL) and C0MBINED_H0 (SEN_MANAGE + IND-DIRECT) are also constructed in a 
similar manner. Each column from a specific group contains the number of observations and the percentage 
respectively. 
Variables / Group ST Group (i=352) 
� r 0 142 40.34 % COMBINED_QU = { � 1 210 59.66 % 
� r 0 205 58.23 % 
COMBINED_PO = { _ L 1 147 41.74 % � r 0 242 68.75 % COMBINED_HO = { � 1 110 31.25 % 
Table 13: Board Structure and Control Variables (ST Companies) , Descript ive 
Stat i s t ics 
Variables ST Companies 
Number % 
… A . , . r 0 99 90.83 CEO�s_cha i r={丄 ^^ g.lT 
, 0 68 62.39 
T o p l � s � t a t e = {丄 41 37 61 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ind-number 2.7982 0.8901 0.0000 5.0000 
Ind_ratio 0.3037 0.0797 0.0000 0.4286 
Toplshare 0.3451 0.1575 0.0956 0.8205 
Sharel-lO -2.0241 0.7322 -4.1673 -0.3954 
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Table 14: Mean-Comparison t-test Between Control and Treatment Groups, Per-
sonal Characteristics and Board Structure 
. MGCLTL Variables t-value Signifcant Level (2-tailed) Treatment Control 
Quali 0.5035 0.6047 -0.6755 0.4999 
Academic 0.2937 0.2868 0.2129 0.8316 
Lawy 0.1608 0.1318 0.6498 0.5163 
Account 0.2587 0.2636 -0.1241 0.9014 
Engineer 0.0769 0.1163 -1.1194 0.2640 
Economist 0.1316 0.0543 2.3535** 0.0193 
Sen—manage 0.1958 0.2093 -0.3045 0.7610 
Reg.official 0.1119 0.1085 0.0679 0.9459 
Cen_official 0.1049 0.0233 2.7158** 0.0070 
IncLdirect 0.0979 0.0696 1.0002 0.3181 
Party _inem 0.3147 0.1705 2.7486** 0.0064 
Consultant 0.1399 0.2016 -1.3807 0.1685 
Society 0.2024 0.2558 -1.0699 0.2856 
CEO-is_chair 0 . 0 4 3 5 0.2222 - 3 . 3 3 4 4 * * 0 . 0 0 1 0 
IncLnumber 3.4565 3.0222 2.4815** 0.0137 
Ind_ratio 0.3338 0.3145 1.7518* 0.0809 
Toplshare 0.3974 0.4341 -0.8474 0.3975 
Sharel_10 -1.7976 -1.6210 -1.5438 0.1238 
ToplJs_state 0.6739 0.6889 -0.4024 0.6877 
* indicates significance at the 10% level 
“ i n d i c a t e s significance at the 5% level 
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Table 15: Event Study, by Different Event Windows 
To conduct an event study, the abnormal return of stocks after the announcement are calculated. First of 
all the stock return, Ru, is defined as the difference between the stock closing price on day t and f - 1，in 
logarithms, i.e. Ru = ln(Pit/Pi,t~i), where Pu is the closing price of stock i on day t. The abnormal return, 
will then be equal to Rit—E(Rit/Xt), where Xt normal returns for time period t. By assuming a stable 
linear relation between the market and stock return (Fama, 1976), we can find out E(Rit /Xt) by estimating 
the model E(Rit/Xt) = ai + Pi Rmt, where Rmt represents the market return at time t. Then the abnormal 
returns, and the cumulative abnormal return, CARi, can also be calculated by CARi = ^-Rjt, which 
is the sum of abnormal returns over the event window. To see the market event in various durations, we 
facilitate the following event windows around the announcement day (day 0): (-1, 1), (-3, 3), (-5, 5), (-10, 
10) and (-10’ 120). 120-day estimation window (-150, -30) is used. 
Event Window Cumulative Abnormal Return t-value 
(-1’ 1) -0.002285 -0.24 
(-3, 3) 0.0049 0.35 
(-5, 5) 0.0001565 0.01 
(-10, 10) -0.0067431 -0.35 
(-10, 120) 0.0040042 0.1 
(0’ 1) 0.0018242 0.23 
(0，3) 0.0088045 0.94 
(0, 5) 0.0093 0.79 
(0, 10) 0.0086723 0.60 
(0, 120) 0.0194226 0.50 
Table 16: Event Study, by Different Categories of Negat ive Opinions 
Only results of using (0’ 3) as the event window are represented in the following table. The whole methodology 
of event study is unchanged, which is the same as the previous analysis. 
Categories No. of Cases Cumulative Abnormal Return t-value 
Board of Directors' Internal Affairs 10 0.0056796 0.64 
External Guarantee Performance 8 -0.0145669 -1.26 
Related Party Transactions 8 0.0139328 0.38 
Asset Appropriation 5 -0.0064413 -0.45 
Asset Transfer 4 0.0319885 0.86 
Capital Funding 3 0.021241 0.48 
Violation of Regulations 3 -0.017989 -1.39 
Auditing Matters 3 0.0660852 0.70 
Miscellaneous 7 -0.0048911 -0.29 
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Table 17: Logistic Regression - Treatment Group Only (n = 144) 
Variables/Models Model (la) Model (lb) 
Pseudo-F? 0.1478 0.1113 
Quali 0.0547 
(0.25) 
Academic 0.7407 0.8685 





















Society -0.9708 -1.0907 
(-1.46) (-1.98广 
* indicates significance at the 10% level 
** indicates significance at the 5% level 
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Table 18: Condit ional Logistic Regression - Treatment Group and Control Group 
Paired Together According to Companies (n = 273). Personal Characteristics Vari-
ables Only 
Variables/Models Model (2a) Model (2b) 
Pseudo-B? 0.1554 0.1060 
Quali 0.0888 
(0.70) 






















Society -0.4879 -0.6503 
(-1.27) (-1.91)* 
* indicates significance at the 10% level 
** indicates significance at the 5% level 
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Table 19: Condit ional Logistic Regression - Treatment Group and Control Group 
Paired Together According to Companies (n = 273). Board Structure and Control 
Variables Only 
Variables/ Model Model Model Model Model Model 
Models (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b) 
Pseudo-If 0.073 0.074 0.112 0.116 0.074 0.117 
CEO�s_chai r -0.9943 -1.0435 -1.4221 -1.4734 -1.0088 -1.4156 
(-1.79)* (-1.88)* (-2.73)** (-2.73)** (-1.85)* (-2.73)** 
Ind-number 0.4753 0.4279 0.4622 
(2.22)** (1.96)** (2.37)** 
Ind_ratio 4.4446 4.2032 4.4812 
(1.97)** (1.87)* (2.00)** 
TopIshare 0.198 -0.4796 
-0.15 (-0.37) 
Sharel-lO -0.111 -0.3396 
(-0.35) (-1.13) 
T o p l J s ^ t a t e 0.6927 0.7904 0.8942 1.0781 0.7191 0.8214 
-1.56 (1.73)* (1.97)** (2.27)** (1.76)* (2.02)** 
* indicates significance at the 10% level 
** indicates significance at the 5% level 
Table 20: Condit ional Logistic Regression - Treatment Group and Control Group 
Paired Together According to Companies (n = 273). Regional Governance Only 
Variables/ Model Model Model Model Model 
Models M (6b) (6c) (6d) (6e) 
Pseudo-B? 0.000 0.008 0.003 0.059 0.067 
ForeignJnvest 0.0374 
(0.51) 
G o v � n t e r v 0.0586 
(1.38) 
Non_state 0.0531 0.0830 
(0.93) (1.43) 
Enforce 0.0743 0.0831 
(3.51)** (3.46)** 
* indicates significance at the 10% level 
** indicates significance at the 5% level 
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Table 21: Conditional Logistic Regression - Treatment Group and Control Group 
Paired Together According to Companies (n = 273). All Variables 
Variables/ Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model 
Models (7a) (7b) (8a) (8b) (9a) (9b) (10a) (10b) 
Pseudo-R^ 0.241 0.235 0.290 0.282 0.225 0.277 0 . 2 7 0 “ 
Quali 0.0627 0.136 0.0533 0.1159 
(0.45) (0.94) (0.38) (0.82) 
Academic 0.3113 0.4311 0.3735 0.564 0.3077 0.4222 0.3645 0.5403 
(0.81) (1.24) (0.92) (1.58) (0.80) (1.22) (0.91) (1.52) 
Lawy -0.1385 -0.358 -0.1531 -0.3356 
(-0.3) (-0.75) (-0.34) (-0.72) 
Acct 0.1653 0.0326 0.1460 0.0257 
(0.44) (0.08) (0.39) (0.07) 
Engineer -1.255 -1.1763 -1.79 -1.709 -1.2397 -1.1731 -1.7399 -1.615 
(-2.00)** (-1.97)** (-2.50)** (-2.56)** (-1.98)** (-1.97)** (-2.45)** (-2.42)** 
Economist 0.7139 0.6779 0.5416 0.7174 0.6881 
(1.35) (1.28) (1.1) (1.36) (1.31) 
SenJVIanage 0.6238 0.6583 0.7408 0.8431 0.5855 0.6413 0.6791 0.7707 
(1.54) (1.73” （1.72 广（2.07)** (1.46) (1.69)* (1.61) (1.93)* 
Reg_official 0.9824 0.8163 0.9282 0.6095 0.9243 0.8097 0.8542 0.574 
(1.79)* (1.61) (1.72)* (1.26) (1.69)* (1.60)* (1.59) (1.18) 
Cen.official 3.5417 3.2681 3.9847 3.378 3.4729 3.2734 3.7827 3.453 
(3.87) (3.99)” （3.66)** (3.55)** (3.81)" (3.97)** (3.62)** (3.77)** 
Ind-direct -0.4477 -0.0595 -0.4615 -0.101 
(-0.78) (-0.10) (-0.81) (-0.18) 
Party _mem 1.0063 0.8726 0.8111 0.7322 1.0093 0.8791 0.8333 0.8002 
(2.48)** (2.24)** (1.97)** (1.88)* (2.49)** (2.26)** (2.04)** (2.06)** 
Consultant -0.4268 -0.3584 -0.4577 -0.4288 
(-0.92) (-0.74) (-0.99) (-0.90) 
Society -0.5591 0.6887 -0.4478 -0.5385 -0.6649 -0.4229 -0.4174 
(-1.34) (-1.76)* (-1.00) (-1.29) (-1.71)* (-0.96) (-1.02) 
CEOJs chair -1.6785 -1.4389 -2.1946 -2.2154 -1.7395 -1.4771 -2.2222 -2.1826 
(-2.45 广（-2.22)** (-3.33广（-3.56 广（-2.57 广（-2.32 广（-3.45)** (-3.55)** 
Ind_number 0.4224 0.6692 0.4084 0.6558 
(1.53) (2.82广 （1.41) (1.74)* 
Ind ratio 5.7977 5.1082 4.9514 4.4109 
(3.46)** (2.09)** (3.29)** (1.83)* 
Topi 3.0191 2.5349 3.5279 2.114 
(2.09)" (1.60) (2.46)** (1.65)* 
Sharel 10 0.5339 0.5581 0.3430 0.336 
“ (1.58) (1.74)* (0.95) (1.16) 
ToplJs_state 0.2935 0.3773 0.3740 0.721 
(0.59) (0.71) (0.73) (1.05) 
Foreign 0.0375 0.0354 0.0421 0.0423 




* indicates significance at the 10% level 
** indicates significance at the 5% level 
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Table 22: Conditional Logistic Regression - Treatment Group and Control Group 
Paired Together According to Companies (n = 273). All Variables 
Variables/ Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model 
Models (11a) (lib) (12a) (12b) (13a) (13b) (14a) (14b) 
Pseudo-R^ 0.270 0.247 0.329 0.315 0.265 0.245 0.321 0.302 
Quali 0.0472 0.1353 0.0397 0.1223 
(0.34) (0.93) (0.28) (0.84) 
Academic 0.2794 0.4023 0.334 0.5786 0.2692 0.3946 0.3157 0.4923 
(0.70) (1.10) (0.79) (1.45) (0.68) (1.08) (0.76) (1.28) 
Lawy -0.0666 -0.2536 -0.0674 -0.2324 
(-0.14) (-0.53) (-0.14) (-0.49) 
Account 0.1102 0.004 0.093 -0.0007 
(0.28) (0.01) (0.24) (0.00) 
Engineer -1.3457 -1.3425 -2.007 -2.0077 -1.3498 -1.3383 -2.0071 -2.0094 
(-2.08 广（-2.13) “ （-2.57 广（-2.63 广(-2.07)** (-2.12)** (-2.53广(-2.59)** 
Economist 0.6983 0.7028 0.4467 0.7064 0.7208 
(1.30) (1.30) (0.89) (1.31) (1.34) 
Sen_manage 0.6415 0.5892 0.889 0.9477 0.6084 0.5622 0.825 0.8693 
(1.54) (1.50) (1.91)* (2.15广 (1.47) (1.44) (1.81) (2.00)** 
Reg-official 1.0815 1.1778 1.1665 1.2351 1.0403 1.1397 1.1048 1.2033 
(1.97)*" (2.22)** (2.06广 * (2.27 广 * (1.90)* (2.16)** (1.97)** (2.22)** 
Cen.official 3.4768 3.0718 3.9451 3.6495 3.4065 3.033 3.7648 3.5407 
(3.72)” （3.77)** (3.6)** (3.75)** (3.64)** (3.69) “ (3.55)** (3.75)** 
IncLdirect -0.5424 -0.2559 -0.5582 -0.299 
(-0.93) (-0.43) (-0.96) (-0.51) 
Party _mem 0.8748 0.7630 0.6402 0.5874 0.8662 0.7651 0.6549 0.6483 
(2.13 广 ( 1 . 9 5 ) * (1.50) (1.46) (2.11 广（ 1 . 9 7 广 ( 1 . 5 5 ) (1.63) 
Consultant -0.4467 -0.4081 -0.4823 -0.4975 
(-0.93) (-0.8) (-1.01) (-0.99) 
Society -0 6361 -0.6912 -0.5578 -0.5747 -0.6181 -0.6724 -0.5323 -0.5439 
(-1.42) (-1.64) (-1.14) (-1.21) (-1.39) (-1.60) (-1.10) (-1.18) 
C E O � s chair -1.734 -1.6894 -2.3082 -2.3051 -1.8131 -1.7372 -2.3227 -2.23 
(-
2
.39 广(-2.52)** (-3.26)** (-3.42)** (-2.53)^* (-2.61)^* (-3.34)** (-3.42)-
Ind-number 0.3275 0.3009 0.2880 0.2649 
(1.14) (1.09) (0.95) (0.91) 
Ind ratio 5.7294 5.6398 4.3186 4.0035 
(3.50 广（3.66)** (3.35)** (3.48)** 
Toplshare 2.0515 1.9457 2.817 2.8611 
(1.32) (1.34) (1.80)* (1.94)* 
Sharel 10 0.2799 0.2835 0.3524 0.3956 
(0.77) (0.84) (1.04) (1.26) 
ToplJs^tate 0.4197 0.6220 0.5606 0.9177 
(0.78) (1.05) (1.00) (1.47) 
ForeignJnvest 
GovJnterv -0.0263 -0.0436 -0.0306 -0.0498 
(-0.4) (-0.67) (-0.46) (-0.75) 
Non_state 0.1652 0.1418 0.2239 0.2005 0.1743 0.1465 0 .2359 0.2043 
(2.02)" (1.99)** (2.55)** (2.64)** (2.11)** (2.05)" (2.66 广（2.72)** 
Enforce 0.0515 0.0521 0.056 0.0523 0.0546 0.0544 0.06 0.0552 
(1.72)* (2.08广（1.75)* (1.89)* (1.82)* (2.18广(1.88)* (2.02广 
* indicates significance at the 10% level 
** indicates significance at the 5% level 
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Table 23: Ordered Logistic Regression - ST companies (n = 352) 
Variables / Model Model (15b) Model (15c) 
Pseudo-R^ 0.1847 0.1849 
Academic 1.2535 1.1586 
(2.08)** (1.92)* 
Engineer -0.0029 -0.0244 
(-0.01) (-0.03) 
Sen_manage 1.3113 1.2444 
(2.51)** (2.42)** 
Reg-official 0.8193 0.7862 
(1.33) (1.29) 
Cen_official 1.7899 1.7933 
(2.40)** (2.42)** 
Party-mem 1.1109 1.1427 
(2 .48 )** (2 .57 )** 
Society -1.1985 -1.2104 
(-1.52) (-1.54) 






ToplJs_state 0.3087 0.3777 
(0.70) (0.85) 
Non^tate 0.2418 0.2326 
(2.33)** (2.24)** 
Enforce 0.0833 0.0759 
(3.35 广 (2.91)** 
* indicates significance at the 10% level 
** indicates significance at the 5% level 
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